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Abstract 
Based on the characteristics of agricultural non-point pollution(ANP), it is pointed out that local governments plays 
important roles of in ANP. Complete information static game model was used to analyze the input in the pollution. 
The conclusion was that when local governments with personal rationality came to Nash equilibrium, the total input 
was less than that with overall rationality in Pareto optimal state. In order to treat agricultural non-point pollution 
together and reach Pareto optimal state with overall rationality, the thesis analyzed the power, procession and security 
mechanism seriously. 
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1. Introduction 
With the expansion of the regional economy, and promot ion of industrializat ion and urbanization, the 
development of agricu ltural non-point source pollution will be aggravated. Non-point pollution is the 
environmental pollution with no fixed  sewage outfall. Agricultural non -point pollution is the water, soil 
and air pollut ion caused by the pollutants without treatment in agriculture and lives. They are: 
(1)Agricultural pollutant source, including water loss and soil erosion , the application  of pesticides and 
chemical fert ilizers, animal dung in rural areas, rural domestic sewage, solid waste and agricultural 
production waste. (2) Forestry pollutant sources include road maintenance and use, deforestation, fertilizer 
use, burning of the grass on waste land and so on. (3) Mine sources pollutants, brought about by as a 
result of mining slag, particulate matter, as well as wastewater. (4) Sources of atmospheric deposition are 
the acids, toxic metals, organic substances and nitrogen and phosphorus caused by atmospheric events. In 
these pollutant sources, agricultural sources of pollution are in the largest scope, deepest extent and 
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broadest distribution. Agricultural non-point source pollution has the characteristics of uncertain time, 
uncertain means and uncertain number. 
In th e r efo r m pr oc ess of de c entr al izat ion  of th e C hines e G ov er n me nt , loc al  g ov ern m ents ar e  increasingly 
becoming independent from the main economic benefits bodies. They are  responsible for the development 
of local economies and protect the functions of the local welfare. They can not be replaced  with a decisive 
role in the ANP. The thesis mainly  makes analysis their behavior characters in  ANP control. Game theory 
is used in analyzing strategies of the pollution control. At last, it finds out the power, process and 
safeguard mechanisms from the perspective of local governments in pollution treatment. 
2. Local authority’s  behavior characteristic in management ANP 
2.1. Characteristic of short-term goal behaviors 
Under the current local authority achievements inspection system, the local authorities main ly pay 
attention to the economic growth in short-term. This not only may manifest their achievements, but also 
bring promotion opportunity directly. However, if the governments don’t attach importance to the 
environment of agricu lture, there will be negative externality to economy development and negative 
influence to the political officials. Therefore, non-point pollution treatment is the least important one of 
multi-targets for them. When it  collides with other targets, local governments of course will ch oose the 
one which brings them maximized benefits. 
2.2. Rent-seeking activity characters of local governments 
Agricultural non-point pollution  in  general has the characteristics of cross -regional admin istrative. For 
the lack of the agricultural non-point source pollution control laws and regulat ions, decentralized  polit ical 
system makes the measures and oversight mechanisms of administrative constraints of local governments. 
All these provide the rent-seeking possibility for local governments. The rent-seeking activities can be 
divided into rent-seeking beforehand and rent-seeking  afterward. Rent-seeking beforehand is to influence 
the regulations and policies benefiting the local non-point pollution treatment in  order to  obtain matching 
funds. Rent-seeking afterward  is to make revenue under the defective treatment mechanism of 
agricultural non-point pollution. Both forms influence the investment and control effective dramatically. 
2.3. Local governments’ free-riding behaviors 
With the attention and regulation from central government in ANP, there are d ifferent regulation 
organizations in diverse admin istrative regions. However, under China’s inter-d istrict div ision of 
administration; it is difficu lt to form a formal system of binding rules of local governments ’ conduct. It 
will bring larger obstacles for the mechanism supply and innovation . 
It is generally believed that the more developed regional economy is and the more revenue the region 
get, the higher attention and input local government will place in  ANP. However, the ANP control is not 
directly related to local government revenue. While it is related to environment concept and revenue from 
pollution-free agriculture and green agriculture. 
3. Local governments’ game behavior in ANP source pollution control 
Suppose that there are n local governments controlling agricultural non-point pollution together, gi is  
the  input of the local government i. In order to discuss conveniently, it is supposed that all governments 
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input the same in the pollut ion, therefore, the total input in pollution treatment is 
i
G g ¦ . The b igger G 
is, the more effective the treatment is, the more revenue the governments can get. 
3.1. Nash equilibrium dominated by individual rationality  
Suppose that the input of local governments is divided into two items, gi is the input of agricultural 
non-point  pol lution control , ix  represents other inputs.  ,i iu x G  i s  the util ity function of local  government i, and 
0, 0i i
i
u u
x G
w w! !w w
. Meanwhile, the input in  non-pollution and non-point pollution control are marginal  
substitution decrease.
xp represents the unit cost in non-pollution control, Gp is the unit cost of non-point 
pollution control(including strategy costs, implementation costs, environmental remediation costs). iM  is 
the total input in agriculture of local governments. Each local government will face the problems: if other 
governments’ choices have been given,  ,i ix g  will be chosen, and make the local governments’ utility 
maximized under budget constraints.  
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Under Nash Equilibrium, the best choice for each local government is the marginal substitution of non -
point pollution and non-pollution control equals to input cost per unit. When each government chooses in 
this way, Nash Equilibrium can be formed. It is named that the total input equilibrium in non-point 
pollution control without outer constraints is: 
1* ( * , , * , * ), *i n ig g g g G g  ¦                  ˄4˅ 
If the supposed utility functions of local government i: 
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Put the constraint into the formula, get the function: 
                                                     * , 1,2,3 ,i i
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The response function indicates “individual rationality” in the process of  ANP control of local 
governments. That is, each local governments  involved in joint management of ANP who want the “free 
rider” behavior caused the lack of capital investment. Thereby it reduces the effective in ANP control. 
3.2. Pareto optimal dominated by overall rationality  
Supposed the total welfare function in regional agriculture production environment is  
1 1 2 2 n nW u u uJ J J    , iJ  is the weightˈand iJ ≥0. The total constraint is : 
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Here, it is supposed that the control target is to make total welfare in agriculture production 
environment maximized. The Lagrange function is: 
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Then the Pareto Optimal First-order condition is: 
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The total Parato optimality constraints in agricultural non-point pollution control are: 
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It can be seen that the overall rational-dominated Pareto optimal conditions require the sum of 
marginal substitution of pollution control and other production input equals to the rat io of unit cost. 
However, it is supposed that local governments provide pollution control without external constraint. 
Therefore, the Parato optimality dominated by overall rationality is not the realistic balance. 
3.3. Comparative analysis  
It is supposed that the utility function of each local government is the same as formula (5), and all 
agricultural budgets is M. Then the government provides the same input in pollutio n under individual 
rationality, the response function (7) can be modified to: 
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Then the total input of pollution under Nash Equilibrium with individual rationality is: 
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While the Parato optimal first order constraint under overall rationality (8-17) transfers to: 
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Put the total constraint in, we can get the optimal construction and total input in agricultural non-
point pollution of single local government: **
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The ratio of input under individual rationality and total rationality is: 
*
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It can be seen that total pollution control input in Nash Equilibrium with individual rat ionality is 
less than that of Parato optimality with total rationality. 
3.4. Behavior power analysis in ANP joint treatment of local government  
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Local governments’ cooperation needs the driving force  from outside. Their cooperation depends on 
interests or arrangements from the central government. (1) Green GDP must be used to reflect the 
interaction between economy and environment as one of the important indicators in sustainable 
development. The central government should perform the appraisal of regional pollution joint control.(2) 
The establishment of ANP Compensation Mechanism.It refers to the financial allocations, subsidies and 
the development of related laws and regulations policy from central government and  local governments. 
local governments should be the main investment bodies in ANP compensation and control 
mechanis m.(3)Induced policy.The central government can make use of measures, including the market 
price regulat ion, tax regulation or economic incentives policies, etc. through the impact of the costs and 
benefits to encourage interaction among local government management of ANP. 
4. Conclusion 
From the analysis above, it is easier to come to the conclusion that under the hypothesis of increasing 
input in ANP from other local governments and central government, the local government will invest 
litt le in current period. Dominated by reasonableness, the two parties in the game tend to form a non-
cooperative game, and ult imately  go into the plight of prisoners. Pareto optimality in the overall rational-
dominated needs external mechanis m as the constraint condition. It also needs the joint management of 
local governments. As can be seen from the game model, the Nash Equilibrium dominated by the 
individual government is under the current performance appraisal system. The total input for ANP control 
is less than that of Pareto optimality under overall rational domination. The jo int management of the ANP 
needs to determine the scope accurately and reach a collect ive decision to build the maintain linkage 
mechanis m. The local government should first give full play to promote the format ion of dynamics of 
innovation in green supply chain and correct market failures , and then set up policies to promote the 
formation of policies’ induced mechanism and Co-management mechanis m of different regions local 
government.In the end, it must provide a symbiotic environment constituted by the government, social 
organizations, the public, market, science and technology. 
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